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Chicago-Kent College of Law
April 6, 2001
MODERATOR
JOHN C. COATES IV, Professor, Harvard Law School
PARTICIPANTS
LEE BUCHHEIT, Partner, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton
ROBIN ENGELSON, Senior Vice President, GE Capital
Commercial Finance
GARY FUNDERLICH, Vice President & General Counsel, AOL
Canada Inc.
LARRY ISAACSON, Partner, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver &
Jacobson
DAVID VAN ZANDT, Dean and Professor of Law, Northwestern
University School of Law
JOHN COATES: Before we get into a back-and-forth on theory
and practice, and discuss how they differ, how they are similar, and
how they can help one another, I want to talk about a few theories
that might help us explore whether the practitioner perspective is or
isn't very different from the academic perspective. The first theory I
have in mind is efficient market theory. The efficient market theory,
in extremely general terms, is that financial markets are efficient, i.e.,
one can look at prices of financial instruments and infer a great deal
of information from the prices and the movements of the prices. Put
differently, the efficient market theory says that it's very hard to beat
the stock market. I didn't want to give the impression in my talk' that
I find efficient markets theorizing useless or wrong in any general
1. Professor Coates's talk discussed some real-world findings that diverged from theorists'
predictions about takeover defenses.
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sense. I just think it can be taken too far. But I'll say, as a general
matter, efficient market theory has had a major influence on the law.
All the major players in the securities industry certainly have been
affected by numerous applications of efficient markets theorizing.
To the extent that we have time, we can also discuss game
theory2 and agency theory. 3 All of these theories, and the academic
world, depend heavily on some fairly controversial assumptions about
how rational people are, how or whether people systematically act in
irrational ways, and how efficient other mechanisms may be in trying
to constrain irrationalities when they occur.
MARKET EFFICIENCY
JOHN COATES: With that general introduction, let me throw it
out to the panel. As practitioners, to what extent do you assume that
the stock markets and financial markets, in general, are working fairly
well? In other words, how often do you find yourself trying to
second-guess those markets, and how often do you simply take what's
reflected in market prices as an assumption and work from it? I'm
going to pick first on Robin, the person at the end of the panel, since
she's probably the most directly involved in financing transactions.
So, what do you think? Are markets efficient?
ROBIN ENGELSON: I think there's a great inefficiency in markets.
As lenders, we use the market to help us establish the enterprise
value of companies, and that impacts decisions about debt and equity
capacity (both for private and public companies). But the market is
just a guide; some of the biggest mistakes as well as some of the
greatest rewards are found in capitalizing on the inefficiencies in the
marketplace. The market has an extraordinarily difficult time with
relative multiples within industries. While analysts may attribute this
2. Game theory has been defined as
[a] general analytical approach to modeling social situations in which the information,
possible actions, and motivations of the actors or players and how those actions lead to
outcomes are all specified in detail. In contrast, the competitive equilibrium model
does not specify what would happen if the demands of consumers exceeded the
available supply.
PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 599
(1992).
3. Agency theory is concerned with the divergence of interests between a principal and its
agent. One important application of the theory is in explaining the relationship between a
firm's shareholders and its managers. See CHARLES E. MAXWELL, FINANCIAL MARKETS AND
INSTITUTIONS: THE GLOBAL VIEW G-1 (1994) (defining agency theory as one that "explains
and investigates costs associated with disputes between management and shareholders").
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to management talent, market position, or other competitive factors,
there is often real opportunity (inefficiency) in the discrepancies.
JOHN COATES: Does anybody on the panel disagree?
DAVID VAN ZANDT: I would say if markets are efficient in the
way you were talking about it, or in the Nirvana sort of way, we
should all pack up and go home because we don't have jobs anymore.
I think part of being in business is identifying places where you can
increase efficiency and take advantage of opportunities, whether it's
arbitrage in financial markets, but just generally in business looking
for places where you can be much more efficient. So, if you're in the
financial business, you're constantly looking for places to contribute
to overall efficiency. I think the question is a little odd. It's a
question we get asked by our students all the time. They like to argue
about efficient markets from a very abstract sense, but the reality is
that it's a question of where the opportunities are.
JOHN COATES: Fair enough. Let me ask the question slightly
differently and make it more one of relative institutional competence.
Let's say you are working for a public company client, the client
announces an acquisition, and then the stock market price of that
client falls dramatically upon announcement of that acquisition. This
happened several times recently. When Phillips bought Tosco a few
weeks ago, for example, it lost about 7 percent of its market value
when they made the pronouncement. 4 What is your reaction to that?
Do you just sit with your client and agree that the markets are all
inefficient and therefore we should just ignore this? Is this something
that can realistically just not enter into your work with clients? In
other words, if David's strongly stated point that business people are
there to ignore markets, that's their job-
DAVID VAN ZANDT: Well, I don't think I said that. I never said
that. No, I said that business people are there to take advantage of all
the information sources. The fact that your stock dropped 7 percent
is a signal of something. It could be that the analysts don't believe in
your business plan for that merger, or they think you're wasting
corporate assets in undertaking that. It could mean that they haven't
4. Shortly after the purchase announcement, Phillips shares dropped from $58.13 to
$53.35, or $4.78 per share. Nikhil Deogun & Alexei Barrionuevo, Phillips to Buy Tosco in $7.49
Billion Deal, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2001, at A3 (stating that Phillips shares were $58.13 at the
time of the announcement); New York Stock Exchange Composite Transactions, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 6, 2001, at C5 (listing Phillips shares at $53.35 shortly after the announcement); see also
Nick Snow, Phillips Makes Surprise Swing Downstream, OIL & GAS INVESTOR, Mar. 2001, at
141 (stating that the purchase announcement stunned investors and Wall Street oil analysts).
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yet recognized the efficiency that you actually see, or that they don't
believe in your prediction of where the market is headed or where the
world is headed. That's what I think it is-it's a piece of information
you would use. You wouldn't ignore it at all.
ROBIN ENGELSON: I guess the real question here is whether it's
relevant or not because it's only relevant to the extent to which the
company needs the markets in order to complete the transaction, i.e,
they are going to do a secondary offering or something like that. In
fact, I have a public client right now that has not announced an
acquisition. They have the option to finance the acquisition either
with a secondary offering or by adding more debt. Many companies
don't have the option to do either. But for those who do, if the
market doesn't react well to the announcement, they can elect to
postpone the secondary until they've proven out the validity of their
strategy. It's not clear whether the market is temporarily right or
wrong; it is clear that if the company didn't have the option that they
would have to pay much more attention to the market's reaction. I've
rarely seen a company that didn't need to raise additional public
equity change its mind on an acquisition because the market didn't
react well.
JOHN COATES: So, market reactions obviously can constrain
choices in a straightforward way. Lee, in the world of sovereign debt,
are there market prices for sovereign debt bonds that you can look to
to get guidance in doing workouts and so on?
LEE BUCHHEIT: There are market prices. But, a sovereign's
ability to repay is only part of the analysis. History has shown that a
sovereign's willingness to repay-in light of domestic political factors
and the international environment-is equally important. The
analysts who look at the sovereign debt market must therefore have a
wider peripheral vision than their corporate counterparts. Just on the
corporate side, it seems to me that if your client is a chief executive
officer who took the decision to make an acquisition that dis-
appointed the market, presumably that conversation goes only one
way. You don't sit around and say, "We got it wrong, George." You
say, "The markets are unenlightened, and we had a failure to
communicate." However, if you take someone in Robin's position, or
anyone who is in the position of looking at the company and being
asked to buy their equity or their debt, it's something of a self-
fulfilling prophecy. Their response is to say, "The markets valued
you this way and that is what I have to take as my basic datum for
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purposes of determining what your borrowing capacity is, what your
payment capacity is, and so forth. It doesn't matter to me as the new
investor whether the markets have analyzed you improperly, have
been unenlightened, or capricious. It is simply a fact."
JOHN COATES: Robin, let me throw this one out to you. If, in
fact, the market reacts very negatively to a transaction that one of
your borrowers has announced, does that change your perception of
the borrower?
ROBIN ENGELSON: No, because it doesn't change the company's
underlying cash flow. And it doesn't change the underlying value of
the company's assets. So it's not really particularly relevant unless
your only exit of the loan is to sell the company in the public market.
But typically that's not the first exit.
JOHN COATES: So, perhaps we can divide loans into two types:
loans that are heavily dependent on assets, where the management
quality might not significantly influence your ability to get repaid
completely, and loans where you are taking more risk that's
associated with the quality and competence of the management team.
And if the company announces a series of transactions where there's
an inference that the company has done a bad job of communicating
with the analysts, that doesn't then start to affect the way you think
about this management team?
ROBIN ENGELSON: That's a separate question from whether it
impacts whether you can make the loan. Typically, in a non-asset
situation, where you're making the loan based on a multiple of cash
flow of the company, the industry the company is in has to trade
within a certain range. So, if that management team over a prolonged
period of time continues to make a series of bad decisions, then its
enterprise value would tend to trade at a lower multiple of that range.
It might ultimately limit somewhat the upside on the senior debt
capacity for that company.
GARY FUNDERLICH: I think to the extent that you are going to
assess management by relying on a drop in market price based on the
announcement of an acquisition, you have to step back and consider
the complexity of the transaction. You must also understand how the
analysts are applying their traditional views of the company, or their
traditional theories about the company, against what they think the
new company will look like.
Moreover, in instances where you have a company moving from
one industry category to another, the analysis is not as straightfor-
2001]
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ward. For example, it's been very noticeable for us that as we [i.e.,
AOL Time Warner] move from the pure internet category to perhaps
the more traditional media category, the analysts and the market
seemingly still haven't decided how to think about us. There is a
series of days where I can tell you the internet stocks move and our
market price tracks that move, the traditional media stocks move and
we track that move, and then one or both of them will move and we
either do not move or we move in the opposite direction. I can't
believe that you can necessarily imply from such movements that it's
an inability of management to communicate properly with the
analysts, or even question management's ability to go forward with a
new company. So much information has to be disseminated,
assimilated, and acted on after an announcement that there is a time
lag before the information is properly reflected in market price. So,
that initial drop does not necessarily indicate that management or the
deal is bad.
JOHN COATES: So, the general consensus on the panel seems to
be that even where the market reaction is significant, unless there is
an immediate problem, like the company needs to turn to the market
to raise more cash, you really don't consider transactions that may
indicate poor communication by management to be a very significant
indicator of management quality. Is that a fair assessment? Larry, do
you disagree?
LARRY ISAACSON: I have no view on this.
JOHN COATES: No view whatsoever?
LARRY ISAACSON: No. But regarding the efficiency of the mar-
kets and how that pertains to my practice, I think every deal I've done
over the last four years has been based on an inefficient market and
the markets' inability to work together. All of my clients are
investment banks and commercial banks, and they're simply taking
advantage of the fact that markets don't work together. The
inefficiencies are quantifiable in the fees financial institutions are
getting on every deal. So, I hope it continues. And as long as it
continues, the clients that I'm servicing will continue to make money.
GARY FUNDERLICH: In my experience, if you were to rely on
what is happening with a prospective transaction partner's market
price to determine whether to go forward with a transaction, you
would have missed some good opportunities and taken on some really
bad ones. I am not aware of a time where a company I have worked
with actually sought out a deal based on the other side's high market
[Vol. 77:121
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price or stepped away from a transaction because of the other side's
low market price. In our business, we've seen both over the last
couple of years, and it still doesn't really influence how we view the
other side to great degree.
JOHN COATES: Dean Van Zandt?
DAVID VAN ZANDT: Just from the M&A [(mergers and acqui-
sition)] market, one of the things you try to do is look at the market
pricing of a company, and you're looking for somebody often times
with a lower multiple. But the reason you're doing this is not an
automatic decision. You're trying to cull out the ones at low
multiples because they have no market, or there's nothing you can do
with those companies, versus the ones who have a low multiple
because of, say, poor management. You can replace the management
and put better management in that company. Another way of saying
that is that the company has some markets it could exploit but hasn't
done so very effectively. So, I don't think it's right to say the market
has no impact on the decision. You're not going to buy one of the
"dot-coin" companies a few months ago, for example, because they
have extremely high multiples and there's not much you're going to
be able to get out of those. But, on the other hand, you don't just go
out and buy low-multiple companies. You buy the companies that,
looking at their business plan or looking at their markets, you think
you can do some things with the company that will raise the multiple,
raise the market capitalization of the company.
ROBIN ENGELSON: So, aren't you really asking whether the
markets' apparent inefficiency is a result of an inability to communi-
cate a difference of opinion?
LEE BUCHHEIT: That's right.
JOHN COATES: Right.
ROBIN ENGELSON: But with perfect information, and with every-
one understanding specifically what the synergy is and filtering out
the noise of conglomerates where subsidiaries aren't performing from
where their true value is and so on, if that were perfectly known, what
would the case be?
GARY FUNDERLICH: I don't know that I would go along with
that. There may be some inability to communicate, but on the other
side I think that the analyst community has created theories and
expectations of its own. Management may be communicating exactly
the information that needs to be communicated, but it may not be
what they think you should be telling them or what they want to hear.
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DAVID VAN ZANDT: I don't think it's one way. I think it's both
sides. When there is a difference of opinion between you and the
analyst community, you have one vision of the company and its
market, and the analysts, right now, have another vision of the
company and the market. One of the two of you is closer to the
ultimate truth of that, and it could be that the analysts are right in this
particular situation or it could be that your business plan is correct.
ROBIN ENGELSON: Then there are other issues, such as stocks
that are not widely publicly traded, so that even the dissemination of
good information or poor information doesn't move the stock one
way or the other because it just doesn't have enough float.
JOHN COATES: I like Robin's distinction of inefficiencies that
arise because information is hard to communicate and not equally
shared versus the notion that there are just simply differing opinions.
Even with the same information set, people can have very strongly
different views of what the future is going to bring. If the only thing
that mattered was cash flows, if we all could agree on what the cash
flows were going to be, then we would all have a consensus on what a
given price ought to be and therefore there wouldn't really be much
more to say. So, cash flows, even though they are obviously quite
critical to coming up with a view about the future, can't be all that
one cares about if you really believe in this different opinion theory. I
think this different opinion theory is hard to convince academics of.
In other words, I would say that a prejudice exists in academia. It's
not a prejudice against the idea that information is not important to
improving on market prices as a signal. Rather, the prejudice would
be that once everybody has the same information we all basically
would agree. And what's interesting is that implies on some level that
value doesn't just all go to cash flow.
I want to play devil's advocate for one more round here on ef-
ficient markets and then move on. Suppose you're now in court
because when you went to a given borrower, or invested in or bought
a given company, you were lied to about the information that was
important to you in making the loan, buying the stock, or doing the
deal. What should the damages be? Is the court, in trying to come up
with some measure of damages, appropriately using market prices as
a way of measuring those damages? Basically, the answer that is
currently enshrined in federal securities law is that the market price
determines the damages in these kinds of lawsuits, if you can find a
market price.
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So, now, to the extent that all of you think fairly skeptically
about market prices as being the most important-or even an
important-source of information for you in making the business
decisions, what does that suggest about whether the courts have got it
right? Should both parties be able to throw additional information
into the mix in trying to prove damages one way or the other? You
really can't do that now in federal securities law. Any views on that?
This is moving out of the business world into policy, but this is an
interesting situation where theory hits you all as practitioners, where
the law takes theory up into itself and enshrines it. And then it really
matters to you in practice because when you're making a loan, you're
making a loan against the possibility of enforcing the lending
agreement. If you try to enforce the lending agreement in court and
the law will only allow you to collect damages in a very particular
way, you've got to take that into account. So, what do people think
about that enshrinement of the efficient market theory?
DAVID VAN ZANDT: No offense to Vice Chancellor Jacobs or
anyone else who is a judge in here, but my view would be that I would
much rather have it tied to an objective measure like the market.
Now, you could bring in evidence as to whether or not a particular
company has a deep enough public market for this valuation process
to work. But there are many advantages to having an objective
number that you can determine at a particular point in time so that
you don't let the lawyers get into all sorts of abstract valuation issues.
You have a completely different problem when it's a private company
or a company with a very thin market. But I think if you have a deep
market, the ideal in that context ought to be to rely almost solely, if
not solely, on the market price. This is in part because of judges'
institutional competence-they've got a whole range of expertises,
but doing valuations, unless you're a very specialized court, is
probably not one of them, particularly for federal judges.
LEE BUCHHEIT: John, I would have thought at least in the lend-
ing context it's fairly clear: if you lend money to a company and you
have a basis for saying there was fraud in the inducement, your
damages are the amount you lent, plus the interest on it, plus the
penalty interest, plus your lawyer's fees in collecting it. And even if
you bought the debt in the secondary market at a discount, I think the
law would still say that your measure of damages is the same. That is
what your judgment will be. Collecting on the judgment is quite
2001]
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another thing, but I think, at least in the lending context, it is very
clear.
ROBIN ENGELSON: Yes, I don't think lenders are looking for
damages, they're just looking for repayment of principal, interest, and
fees.
GARY FUNDERLICH: You do not always have a measure as
concrete as principal, interest and fees. Whether it's a good thing or a
bad thing, I tend to go along with using market price. At least you've
got an objective measure. However, I think that it goes a little bit
further. If you valued the deal on something unique to you or the
way you viewed the transaction, why not contract to the ultimate
settlement? Give the court a proper calculation to apply if you don't
believe in the market price.
JOHN COATES: In some sense, that is what lenders do, perhaps
for precisely that reason. There is an interesting contrast between
fraud that relates to debt and fraud that relates to equity investments
in that in the latter you have a built-in measure of damages that's
objective and different from the measure that would be derivable.
Maybe the Supreme Court [in Basic Inc. v. Levinson] got it right,5 not
because the theory is a particularly good one, but rather it's just the
best theory for the courts to use in particular and it really doesn't
have any more general application than that. It's worth pausing at
this point, though, because the New Jersey Supreme Court just
rejected the efficient market theory, just rejected the fraud-on-the-
market theory. 6 The court made the mistake that you all didn't just
make, which is to jump from "markets obviously are inefficient" to
"therefore we should just not really pay much attention to markets
when setting damages."
RATIONALITY
JOHN COATES: Let's move on to a level that is slightly deeper,
or more abstract, or sillier, depending on your perspective. The
efficient market theory always has been grounded on the notion that
individuals are relatively rational, meaning that they pursue relatively
well-definable goals like wealth maximization given equal knowledge.
So, theorists of that sort haven't traditionally accepted the notion that
5. 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (holding that applying a rebuttable presumption of reliance
supported by fraud-on-the-market theory is appropriate).
6. Kaufman v. i-Stat Corp., 754 A.2d 1188 (N.J. 2000).
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people act irrationally in any kind of systematic way. To what extent
does that make any sense to you as practitioners? Is that real? Is that
part of your world? Do people act in rational, predictable ways or do
they act in predictably irrational ways in various settings? Any
thoughts on that? Larry?
LARRY ISAACSON: I assume that all the actors in the capital
markets are acting rationally. It's just that their separately acting
rationally creates opportunities because they don't act together
rationally. They act separately. So, for example, the deals that I do
might combine the emerging market, sovereign debt market, the
AAA,7 investment-grade, and subinvestment-grade markets in the
United States.8 Those markets don't act together. And while each
may act rationally separately, that in itself creates inefficiency and an
opportunity on which people can capitalize. So, I don't assume that
people don't act rationally, I just think that their rational behavior,
which is investing in certain markets in certain ways, creates
opportunities. At least it does in my practice.
LEE BUCHHEIT: I hope that they don't act rationally all the time,
if by "rationally" you mean they always act without emotion. That
would put many of us out of business. For example, if you're
representing sovereign issuers of debt, you make your living trying to
persuade otherwise sensible investors to give you their money,
sometimes against a backdrop of not having repaid the last group of
investors. Were the new investors acting in an entirely dispassionate
way, they probably would reject that argument. Part of the lawyer's
job is to present the sovereign client in a way that says to investors,
"The dawn has come up in Ruritania, and we are a new country with
a new president and so forth." Thus, it all depends on what you mean
by "rational." If by "rational" you mean "rational but still susceptible
to persuasion," that's the kind of counterparty I like.
JOHN COATES: That's a revealing description. I like that one.
Gary, when you are negotiating business contracts with
counterparties, how rational are they?
GARY FUNDERLICH: Ours is a tough world to strictly apply
traditional ideas of rationality. If you look over the last couple of
7. The AAA market is the market for the highest-quality, safest debt. AAA is the highest
rating that a rating agency such as Standard & Poor's or Moody's gives.
8. "Investment-grade" refers to the highest-grade bonds, graded BBB and above by the
rating agencies. "Subinvestment-grade" refers to categories rated lower than the investment-
grade categories (including BB, C, etc.).
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years it is really difficult to say, at least at first blush, that people have
acted rationally. However, to follow up on something that Lee just
said, if you start to hone in on what one means by rational behavior,
you may come to a different conclusion. If I come in as a subsequent
creditor knowing you haven't paid, but I am able to get a couple of
tenths of a percent better on my return or I have preferences or some
other additional rights superior to the creditors who are ahead of me,
is it irrational for me to do that, even knowing that my risk is higher?
As long as the risk and return are properly balanced I wouldn't
consider that irrational. Now, have I seen transactions where I would
love to see the justification document that was done to get the deal
through? Absolutely. However, if I knew that somewhere somebody
or some group of people who used their best efforts have come to the
conclusion that the risk and return potential is there, then yes, I
would have to say they acted rationally. Even though on the surface
probably not.
JOHN COATES: "On the surface, probably not." That's interest-
ing. So, you actually do think in most circumstances there's some way
to rationalize or justify things that appear to be quite irrational at first
blush?
GARY FUNDERLICH: That's been my experience.
JOHN COATES: Interesting. And again, relative consensus on the
panel.
Let me throw some theory at you. It used to be obscure, but
over the last five or ten years it has been showing up in more practical
applications. The theory goes generally under the name of behavioral
economics or behavioral finance, and says that under a variety of
conditions you can predictably find irrational behavior even in capital
markets. One wonderful paper that I've seen recently involved a
study of the people who went into online trading early.9 The study
dealt with thousands of people; it studied thousands of accounts and
not just idiosyncratic moments. 10  Basically, people consistently
overestimated their ability to do well.1" The amount of their trading
went up dramatically while the amount of their returns went down
dramatically. Under traditional economic analysis this is a little
problematic because trading online cuts the commissions, reduces
9. Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, Online Investors: Do the Slow Die First?, 15 REv.
FIN. STUD. (forthcoming March 2002).
10. See id.
11. See id.
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transaction costs, and makes it easier for you to achieve your rational
ends. Those who went into online trading early were mostly men
between the ages of eighteen and thirty. The online traders grossly
underperformed both their own performance prior to moving online
and the performance of men in the same demographics-same age,
same wealth, same education, same everything-who had not made
the switch. So, there are numerous studies out there finding these
huge pockets of apparent irrationality in the financial markets.12
DAVID VAN ZANDT: I guess the problem really is defining "ra-
tionality" because on that theory racetracks or gambling parlors
shouldn't exist. I'm a strong believer that the important point is that
the institutional structure in which you decide whether something is
rational or not can vary and therefore things that look rational in one
context are not so rational in other contexts. But it's a definitional
game; you're going back and forth. The other thing to say about it is
this. Let's take day trading: within the institutional context and the
information people were getting at the time they made their
decisions, they probably were acting quite rationally until they
updated their predictions about what happened. You don't see a lot
of day traders right now because it is not a rational strategy. Sure,
many people did act irrationally, but if irrationality was widespread,
there would still be a day-trading market. This is Gary Becker's point
about long-term rationality. There's a lot of behavioral psychology
that talks about irrationalities such as when people are more likely to
try to avoid a loss than take an opportunity for gain, if I have that
right. But it's an asymmetry. If you look at markets over the long
haul, and where there are institutional mechanisms to arbitrage, then
I think those things disappear. There are some behavioral finance
people like Robert Shiller'-and I'm not up on exactly where he
thinks the difference is, but it strikes me as a lot of the examples
we're talking about really depend largely on how you define what
rationality is in a particular institutional context.
12. See, e.g., RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, (SOME OF) THE ESSENTIALS OF
FINANCE AND INVESTMENT 180-81 (1993) (defining some biases relevant to investor behavior
such as the endowment effect, loss aversion, insensitivity to small probabilities, cognitive
dissonance, and self-confidence); Daniel Kahneman et al., The Endowment Effect, Loss
Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193 (1991); Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependant Model, 106 Q.J. ECON.
1039 (1991); Barber & Odean, supra note 9.
13. See generally ROBERT J. SHILLER, MARKET VOLATILITY (1992); ROBERT J. SHILLER,
IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2001).
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LEE BUCHHEIT: It seems to me the ability to rationalize after the
fact does not mean that you acted rationally during the fact. We can
all rationalize. Let's take a business negotiation. The fellow sitting
on the other side of the table understands your position-perhaps
even agrees with it in an intellectual sense-but nevertheless decides
not to close the deal. It is quite possible that the other party has
simply concluded, "I don't trust you. I believe the arithmetic, but," to
pick up on something that our colleagues said this morning,14 "my gut
tells me you are not the kind of people I want to do business with.
This guy wears French cuffs, and I'm a button-down kind of guy." In
other words, in the broadest sense, "acting rationally" may involve an
element of gut or emotion or intuition. These elements can be
identified later in an ex post rationalization of why I made the
decision I did.
DAVID VAN ZANDT: But I would say that's rational ex ante.
LEE BUCHHEIT: Perhaps so.
DAVID VAN ZANDT: You know, sometimes the only and best
information you have is that you believe he's wearing the wrong
cufflinks, which you believe is a signal that you should not trust the
guy no matter what the numbers say. That's your best information
and that's acting very rationally. What would be irrational in that
context would be to go forward with the deal.
LEE BUCHHEIT: Yes. Wasn't it Clarence Darrow who said, "I
don't like shredded wheat and I don't like anybody that does"?
ROBIN ENGELSON: I think, David, your point about what is the
definition of "rational" is critical here because it's not particularly
rational that a company that could borrow at four times its cash flow
a year ago, or eighteen months ago, today can only borrow three
times its cash flow from a senior lender. So, a company that had not
otherwise experienced any change and still had $100 million in cash
flow could borrow $400 million last year, and today that company is
lucky if it can borrow $300 million (the senior credit markets are still
reducing their leverage tolerances). So, there's nothing particularly
rational about that other than the lenders doing that in the credit
markets are doing it in concert with one another. One institution
can't lend $400 million while another institution would only lend $300
million because it has to be accepted by enough other lenders in order
14. See Tamar Frankel, Of Theory and Practice, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 5 (2001).
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for the transaction to be completed or to "clear market." A $300
million transaction would likely have more than a dozen lenders.
JOHN COATES: So, this would be a way in which individual ra-
tionality can nevertheless produce collective irrationality.
ROBIN ENGELSON: It's the "lemming effect."
JOHN COATES: OK, the "lemming effect." I'll make one point
about some of David's comments. I think the analogy of the
racetrack unfairly suggests that these online traders were changing
the way they thought about what they're doing from investing to
betting. When they bet at the racetrack, they know they are probably
going to lose on average, so they're doing it for consumption; they're
doing it for fun. This analogy suggests that the fact that they all lost
tons of money when they went online just means they were having
fun. There are some problems with that theory or that rationalization
of their behavior. One, I don't think many of the online traders
would agree that that's what they thought they were doing; they were
not just there to burn money. And two, the amount of money
individuals have in their savings that can be burned up in this way is
vastly different. So, it's possible that you might have the extreme
gamblers out there, but-
DAVID VAN ZANDT: That wasn't my point, though. My point
was not that the day traders are like gamblers. That's been made in
the popular press. No, my point was that the definition of rationality
depends a lot on the institutional structure in which you are acting.
And you're absolutely right. By the way, there are some gamblers
who think they're going to win, but hopefully most gamblers are there
for the entertainment value, and they know they're going to spend a
certain amount of money, and that makes that a highly rational kind
of behavior. If you said only, "I'm going to look at the return on
investment from gambling," if you took that lens, use that definition
of rationality, then it's completely irrational to spend time doing it.
My point wasn't that day traders are identical to gamblers; it was that
it depends on the institutional context and your definition of
rationality as to whether or not it is rational. We throw this word
around, and we've got to be precise about our definitions.
LEE BUCHHEIT: Isn't the purer example of completely irrational
commercial behavior a state lottery? There's no entertainment value
in the state lottery. It's like tech stocks: "Hey, ya' never know!"
JOHN COATES: Let me give you an even purer example of irra-
tionality. When 3Com Corporation announced that it was going to
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spin off Palm, Inc., it sold a portion of the Palm stock to the public
before it completed the spin-off. 5 So, you could get Palm stock in
one of two ways: you could buy Palm stock directly on the market, or
you could buy 3Com stock and know that when the record date for
the dividend of the subsidiary stock occurred you were going to get
Palm stock in the future. The market, for over seven months,
differently priced those two stocks to the tune of roughly $3 billion
between the two. Now, there's a great paper by Thaler (at the
"other" Chicago school) that explores why this discrepancy could
persist for as long as it did.16 Part of the reason is that it is very
difficult to short stock. It's much more difficult to short stock than
most people appreciate. First, you've got to find somebody to lend
you the stock so you can do the shorting, and there is only a small
number of institutions that engage in that sort of practice. So, only a
very small subset of the overall float is available for shorting. Second,
there are legal restrictions on shorting and so forth. Third, there is a
limited number of people willing to take the risk involved in setting
up the shorts to begin with. It seems, thus, that the arbitrage that we
normally think of as being possible-the ability of people to intervene
in the markets in correcting mispricings - is far from being unlimited,
and is actually quite small. In this case, it apparently was less than $3
billion.'
And, where did this mispricing arise to begin with? Why in the
world did people who were directly buying into Palm stock so
overvalue the company, or, conversely, why did the people buying
3Com stock so undervalue the stock? One of the two groups must
have been wrong in an egregious fashion for a long period of time.
Do you have any reactions to that anecdote? Are the markets
behaving rationally consistently over time?
DAVID VAN ZANDT: Over time, they generally are quite effi-
cient-quite rational, quite efficient.
JOHN COATES: So, it all becomes a question of how rational,
which I think is fair.
15. Floyd Norris & Lawrence M. Fisher, Offspring Outweighs Parent As Offering Hits the
Market, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2000, at Al; Seth Schiesel, 3Com Plans to Spin Off Its Palm Unit,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1999, at C1.
16. OWEN A. LAMONT & RICHARD H. THALER, CAN THE MARKEr ADD AND
SUBTRACT? MISPRICING IN TECH STOCK CARVE-OUTS (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. W8302, 2001).
17. See id. at 5.
[Vol. 77:121
ROUNDTABLE: THEORY'S CONTRIBUTIONS
REPUTATION
JOHN COATES: One last area that I want to talk about is reputa-
tion, and then we'll take questions and talk a little bit about how
theory could be more useful to practitioners. Reputation is
something I alluded to in my talk, but it is one aspect of practice
where I think academics can learn a lot from practitioners. To what
extent does the other person's reputation matter to you when you do
business, and how do you go about finding out about reputation? Or,
do people's reputations sometimes not match your experience of their
behavior? Any reactions to that? Robin, do you make character
loans?
ROBIN ENGELSON: Every loan is a character loan. And the only
loans I've ever had trouble with are the ones where there was bad
character.
JOHN COATES: Bad character that you knew about ahead of
time?
ROBIN ENGELSON: No, except in one particular instance where,
actually not related to the business that the fellow was in, he had a
prior legal issue which he exposed and greatly apologized for and
talked about how he was "recovered," so to speak. And based on the
fact that the prior problem really wasn't particularly in a business
context, we gave him the chance to redeem himself, and made the
loan. It turned out that the behavior repeated itself later on. We
were fine in the end, but the aggravation was certainly not worth
having taken the chance.
JOHN COATES: So, reputation matters intensely, and your one
out-of-equilibrium experience suggests you'll never do that again.
How do you get information about another person's reputation?
What do you do as a lender (other than interrogating others about
their past, which is sort of a direct, one-on-one way)? Are these trade
secrets?
ROBIN ENGELSON: It's a tough question. I think a lot of it is
your-as I think Tamar would appreciate-"gut. '' 18 Some of it is
observation, and some of it is past reputation, but it varies where you
find that. And depending upon the size of the company and whether
it's public or private, there are other sources you can use to validate
that, such as ratings and analyst views and web-based research and all
those sorts of things.
18. See Frankel, supra note 14, at 16-24.
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LARRY ISAACSON: My view about how much people care about
the character of their transacting partners is a bit different. I've seen
clients that have had failed trades, and they want to sue their
customer. They hire lawyers and do everything to prepare for
litigation, and then the suit ultimately gets dropped. And I say to
myself, "Well, that animosity will last only until the client calls for
another trade." And, of course, the clients say they'll never do
business with that customer again and then three months later they
want to do a deal again with the same exact customer. That's exactly
what I would expect in the investment banking communities. I think
it's somewhat similar to what you see in the sovereign debt commu-
nity, where a country defaults but banks come back to the table and
make new loans to the country. In the lending context, in Robin
Engelson's business, character probably matters more.
LEE BUCHHEIT: I think individual reputation is very important.
Most lawyers are jealous of their reputation for competence, honesty,
fairness, and the ability to get the deal done. And the litmus test
comes, as it does sometimes, when a client wants you to tell a lie to a
counterparty, or at least not to tell them the truth. A lawyer's instinct
says, "No, I'm not going to do that because long after you, Mr. Client,
are gone, the damage to my professional reputation will linger." And,
therefore, individuals, whether business people or professionals, are
usually very jealous of their reputation. This acts to curb some forms
of outrageous behavior.
LARRY ISAACSON: I agree with you. I relish the opportunity
sometimes-though I don't use it all the time-to tell a client "no"
because I find that I generally get more respect after I've done that.
There are a lot of other practitioners who wouldn't have the nerve to
be forceful and tell someone "no" in those contexts.
JOHN COATES: All of you are sometimes agents and sometimes
clients. When you're a client, how do you go about trying to assess
the reputation of a person you're about to hire-say, a lawyer that
you're about to retain? I wonder how easy it is for subsequent clients
really to find out about those things. If a lawyer has committed legal
violations and been arrested for drug use, that's one thing. But we're
talking now about sharp practice, lying that doesn't rise to the level
actionable fraud, general shady behavior, withholding information in
situations where you know it would change the other person's view of
the deal, and those sorts of things. I gather that avoiding such things
is really what you mean by protecting your reputation. How do you
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find out whether the other side has done such things in the past? Do
people have a sense of "word of mouth"?
LARRY ISAACSON: If they change lawyers a lot, if I see they've
gone from law firm to law firm to law firm, I'm pretty suspicious
about what's going on.
JOHN COATES: Oh, I see. Worrying about the client?
LARRY ISAACSON: Yes. First the client used Cleary, Gottlieb,
Steen & Hamilton, and then used Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver &
Jacobson, and then used someone else; the client keeps trading in
different lawyers. The client is either shopping for opinions or their
lawyers have dropped them as clients.
LEE BUCHHEIT: Yes, or there's a trail of unpaid bills behind
them.
DAVID VAN ZANDT: That's sharp practice.
GARY FUNDERLICH: There are two things that I do when look-
ing to engage outside counsel. First, I have a trusted circle of outside
counsel that I work with regularly, and if I need to go outside of that
circle-and those people, by the way, have either come through
referral or a trusted source-I survey them for suggestions or
opinions. It's fairly easy in Toronto because there's not a very large
community, so I can get good feedback in that regard. Secondly, I
actually have an interview. It's amazing because if you sit down and
talk about various scenarios, you get a feel for how the person
conducts their business, how they view their practice, and how they
are likely to conduct themselves with your business. I think if you
spend the time and you use your best interviewing skills you can get a
good feel for somebody. You're never going to be 100 percent
certain.
JOHN COATES: So, this is the "gut" point, really. Interestingly,
the emphasis is not really so much on reputation because here you're
not directly relying on third parties, although you mentioned that,
too. But you're really relying on your own ability to learn something
directly from the other person's behavior.
One last question: If you consider reputation as being on a slid-
ing scale from really evil to really angelic, do you ever want to work
with someone who's towards the evil end? Are there certain
circumstances when you would rather have somebody who is more
willing to do things that a large group of people surveyed might say
constitutes unfair or incorrect behavior in some general social sense?
I'm thinking in particular about when you are hiring litigators (maybe
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as a transactional lawyer I have a certain bias). Do you really want
the nice guy in the courtroom?
GARY FUNDERLICH: It depends on the circumstances. If you are
talking about one of the relationships that perhaps Claire Hill was
talking about in her paper, 9 where you are really looking to either
reopen or continue the information flow, and you're looking for a
longer relationship, I think what you look for is somebody who is
simply a decent practitioner. If you are confronted by a firm or
individual who is aggressive or plays on the margin, you may want
someone who understands those sorts of behaviors, can anticipate
them, and has a reputation for being able to operate the same way. I
do think there are situations where you may want to look to the
darker side of the continuum you described, but it really depends on
the circumstances and where you want to come out at the end of the
litigation or the claim.
DAVID VAN ZANDT: I don't think we should conflate civility,
which is partly what you're talking about, with ethical behavior
because I think there's a big difference between the two. It's clear
that in the market for litigators, and even to some extent transactional
lawyers, people specialize along different points on the civility line.
Now, obviously the courts are concerned about this, and the bar is
concerned about it. But there are situations where you do want a
litigator who is very good at coming in and trying to really scare and
really beat up on the other side. It's probably not a lot of situations.
But I don't think we should equate that with unethical behavior.
They develop a reputation, and if their service to their client is good
and otherwise ethical, I don't think we should criticize people for
that.
LEE BUCHHEIT: I think the difference is this: You hire a corpo-
rate lawyer to negotiate a transaction for you; that is almost by
definition the beginning of a business relationship between the two
principals. Litigation, however, is the end of a business relationship.
A corporate lawyer's behavior, in the context of the negotiation,
reflects upon his or her client. And if the corporate lawyer comes
across as grasping, gratuitously aggressive, or uncreative or
unreasonable, all of that can poison the business relationship that
their client and the other party are about to enter into. Sometimes
you walk out of a negotiating room and your client says, "When this
19. See Claire A. Hill, A Comment on Language and Norms in Complex Business
Contracting, 77 CHI.-KENTL. REV. 29 (2001).
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transaction ends I don't ever want to ever see these people again." If
that disappointment is caused by the behavior of the other side's
lawyer during the negotiations, has that lawyer really helped his
client? On the other hand, if you're at the litigation stage, you're
probably not looking forward to a bright future with the other side.
For that reason, you're prepared to tolerate a little more of the
gladiatorial instinct in your counsel.
ROBIN ENGELSON: And I guess I would just add to that that
many borrowers will consider which lender to pick based on what
lawyer they're going to use to document the loan. And it's not a
function of being evil or not being evil, but being simple and
straightforward and getting the communication out there that needs
to be out there, without a lot of excess semicolons and commas.
DAVID VAN ZANDT: Particularly since the borrower is paying
for their lawyer, which always griped me. It is not a well-designed
incentive system.
QUESTIONS
JOHN COATES: Do we have any questions from the audience?
QUESTIONER ONE: Yes. SEC Regulation FD in essence prohib-
its disclosure of nonpublic material information to analysts that isn't
disclosed to the market. 0 My concern with this when it was enacted
by the SEC was that it would cut off the flow of information to the
market and lead to stock volatility. I've seen some increased
volatility after the regulation actually went into effect. What is the
general consensus on the panel about that?
DAVID VAN ZANDT: I think I just saw a study that actually had
tested that and saw no increase in volatility, though it's a short time
period still.21
QUESTIONER ONE: Yes, there is one study suggesting that there
is no increase in volatility, but from the sample size it's not entirely
clear.
JOHN COATES: Does anybody here deal with the stock market
and analysts enough to have a view on this? No, probably not.
20. SEC Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243 (2000).
21. See John Labate, Disclosure Rule Has Not Fuelled Market Volatility, FIN. TIMES
(LONDON), March 19, 2001, The Americas, at 6, available at http://www.ccbn.com/regulationfd/
20010319.html (citing an SEC study that suggested SEC Regulation FD has not led to an
increase in stock market volatility).
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QUESTIONER Two: This question is for Lee and Larry because I
know Lee deals with this and Larry I think has. Lee, you talked
about persuading people to lend money or make some kind of
accommodation when they've been shafted in the past. In a way, that
story creates a new good reputation in a vacuum. And Larry, I know
that you have all these parties that are in some kind of loose web in
which they're all doing business with each other again and again. If
you are a new sovereign who wants to redeem himself or a new
entrant in the business, is there any kind of shorthand to gaining
credibility other than hiring the likes of you? Usually one thinks of
getting a good reputation, but this takes time. I'm just wondering
whether there are techniques, and maybe it is just hiring one of you.
LARRY ISAACSON: My practice is very lawyer driven. New
entrants hire me precisely because I've done sixty of the same deals in
the last four years. It's the easiest way in which clients can get
credibility because they're willing to pay expensive lawyers to do the
deals and the clients know that the lawyers can enhance the clients'
reputations. I think that is one way to do it. The other way is to do
just the kinds of things you would expect: work hard and use clever
and interesting ways to develop relationships and not just do what
other banks are doing. It's not easy. The easiest way to jump-start
it-I know this sounds self-serving-is to hire a lawyer. And I try not
to use precedents from one client to the next. So, for each new client
I have to get all my resources together and try to craft a new way to
do the same old thing.
QUESTIONER Two: Could a new lawyer enter into this business
and it would be the same kind of thing?
LARRY ISAACSON: It's hard. I think I now get the same kind of
work because we've done it before. The new lawyers getting into the
business that I've been doing are trying to do exactly what you would
expect: they're trying to compete on costs or compete in other ways.
Fortunately, that's not been too successful.
LEE BUCHHEIT: I'll answer from the sovereign standpoint.
Sovereigns have the charming characteristic that governments
change-either constitutionally or extraconstitutionally-from time
to time. If a prior government had imprudent economic or financial
policies, they can sometimes be disowned by a successor government.
Sometimes the secret is knowing when to confess one's sins. Public
contrition can occasionally disarm one's critics. And then you move
on to say, "We've learned our lessons. Ruritania is now creditworthy,
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and trust us, the regrettable things that happened to those other
investors will never happen to you." Sometimes the job is knowing
when and how to disarm legitimate criticism and present oneself as
being different from the authors of some prior unpleasantry.
QUESTIONER THREE: To what extent does someone's attempt to
ingratiate himself or herself impact your desire to make a loan?
ROBIN ENGELSON: Well, I guess that the biggest issue for all of
us is that if throughout a career we're associated with people who are
either intentionally or unintentionally not successful, that impacts us.
And so it's incumbent upon all of us to make sure that we're taking
on either clients or loans or acquisition targets or whatever where the
value of the information or the underlying integrity is intact.
LARRY ISAACSON: But I thought you would say it's the reverse:
not that being nice gets the person the loan, but that doing things that
antagonize the lender means the person will not get the loan.
ROBIN ENGELSON: Well, I didn't say being nice gets the loan.
LARRY ISAACSON: Right.
LEE BUCHHEIT: Yes, I don't think charm alone can get you a
loan from an institutional lender. Does a borrower try to put up a
presentable individual to negotiate the loan? Absolutely. And do
they try to bond with their counterparts? Absolutely. If they didn't,
half the golf courses in the country would close. But I imagine there
is a point at which it is possible to be too slick, and to come across as
too shallow or facile, and trigger what you call the "gut reaction," the
instinct that says the person in front of me may be more flash than
substance.
QUESTIONER FOUR: I think John Coates alluded to something
when he was talking about takeover defenses: when he asked his
clients, they really didn't seem to care, or that if you look across the
board, people were indifferent about what you did, whether you used
takeover defenses or not.22 As lawyers, I think we tend to find
distinctions in our wording. And as Claire Hill talked about, she said
she did a small sampling and she thought that, yes, these words are
very different. 23 My question is, would you as business people accept
that, or do you think that the numbers really are what the numbers
are in a takeover, for example? And whatever these theories are that
are either coming from academia or that have been somehow
22. John C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers, 89
CAL L. REV. 1301 (2001).
23. See Hill, supra note 19, at 52 n.54.
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ingrained in practice, do they affect your business, or are they
irrelevant? So, is a lawyer just someone that you need to go through
but doesn't necessarily add value to your transaction?
JOHN COATES: Does law matter?
ROBIN ENGELSON: Oh, I think there are tremendous economic
differences that result from the documentation of a transaction one
way or another, though that doesn't refute the fact that it's not a
nuisance that you have to go through the process.
DAVID VAN ZANDT: I would say that I don't think it's either/or.
I'm agreeing: I think there are some parts of the document that are
extremely important to the economics of the deal. There probably
are some other parts of it that lawyers spend time on and clients don't
stop them because it's not worth the clients' monitoring costs to stop
it, but probably at the end it doesn't make an economic difference.
But I don't think it's either black or white. John's data24 is very
interesting, and one hypothesis might be that takeover defenses are
irrelevant in this context because, as somebody suggested, they're
dwarfed by all sorts of other things. You know, we don't have the
studies yet of whether or not IPOs [(initial public offerings)] really do
have different pricing depending upon takeover defenses. It could be
something that doesn't make a Whole lot of difference to the
economics of a deal, but also it's costly for clients to monitor their
lawyers and stop wasteful practices. So, they're going to go let the
lawyers go ahead and argue about a few of those things if it doesn't
really impact them economically.
QUESTIONER FOUR: Robin, can you explain how your document
can change economically?
ROBIN ENGELSON: From the lender's perspective or the bor-
rower's perspective?
QUESTIONER FOUR: Well, there obviously are key terms. But I
don't know if those are things that a lawyer would bring to the table
or to the document versus what you as a businessperson are going to
negotiate on either side. So, when you say that a lawyer can really
change the economic value of a document from either side, I guess,
I'm just curious in practice how that works?
ROBIN ENGELSON: Well, I guess in practice, going to some of the
comments that Claire Hill made earlier,25 the remedies section of the
24. Coates, supra note 22.
25. See Hill, supra note 19, at 45-51.
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document, depending upon how that's documented, can lead to
different actions when it comes time for those remedies to be
exercised. Of course, that's the time at which a lot of the ex ante, if
you will, economic value is determined. Another factor that can
affect the economic value of a transaction is how well that transaction
was documented: who was protected, what their rights were, who gets
to do what when, which assets belong to whom and for how long, and
the other issues that come into play there.
LARRY ISAACSON: I think that viewing lawyering as document-
ing is the problem. I think that the reason I'm hired, to some extent,
is because I'm second-guessing my own clients' decisions or
participating in those decisions with my clients. I'm not just
documenting, I'm also thinking about the same business issues that
they're thinking about. And that is really where, to a large extent, I
add value.
I had a client that for four years has been marketing managed
pools of bonds and selling securities based on these managed pools of
bonds. They sold these managed pools of bonds by touting all the
virtues and effects of management. Recently, they sent me a term
sheet to do a deal that was a static pool, which basically would be
exactly the same as what they had been selling-the managed pools-
but without management. I assume they had analyzed the economics
from an arbitrage perspective. During a conference call, I noted, "I
assume you've considered that if this deal is successful, or in fact
more successful than your managed deals, then the markets will
perceive that all you've been saying about management wasn't true."
There was just dead silence on the other end of the line. I haven't
heard from that client in a couple of weeks.
JOHN COATES: I think that's a great note on which to break. It's
been a fascinating discussion.
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